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Abstract
In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from [18]
in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and
show that it has a number of advantages.
1 Aim of This Paper
In [18], signed propositional systems for paraconsistent reasoning were intro-
duced and six central consequence relations were defined and studied. Three
of the consequence relations are called signed, the three others are called un-
signed. Some further consequence relations were defined in [18] and extended
and studied in later works, for example [19].
In this paper we characterize the six central consequence relations in terms
of adaptive logics. Doing so has a number of advantages. First, it avoids several
complications (the preparation of the premises in negation normal form, their
translation to a signed language, reasoning in terms of extensions) and hence
makes the consequence relations more transparent. Next, it provides them with
dynamic proofs, with a characteristic semantics, and with decision methods at
the propositional level. Third, it makes several extensions obvious—we shall
present the extension with a detachable implication and the extension to the
predicative level. The extensions are absolutely straightforward whereas they
are tiresome (if at all possible) on the signed approach. Even at the predicative
level, there are partial decision methods and criteria (see [14] and [15] for tableau
methods and [11] for procedural proofs). Fourth, it gives the consequence re-
lations a place in a unified framework, which facilitates the comparison with
other inconsistency-handling logics. Fifth, it provides them with easy proofs of
many metatheoretic properties.
∗Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from
the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders.
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After introducing some notational conventions in Section 2, we present the
consequence relations in Section 3. For reasons that become clear later, we shall
deviate from the original definitions for the prudent consequence relations. We
introduce the required paraconsistent logic in Section 4 and explain the working
of adaptive logics in standard format and introduce the required adaptive logics
in Section 5. In Section 6, the signed systems are characterized by adaptive
logics and the characterization is proved adequate. In Section 7 the original
prudent consequence relations are discussed. The unsigned one coincides with
the modified one presented in Section 3; the signed one will be shown to be
defective (but will nevertheless be characterized by an adaptive logic). In Section
8, the consequence relations are extended, first to a language including the
detachable implication of CL, next to the full predicative language. Finally, in
Section 9, we briefly survey what was realized and comment on the consequence
relations and the signed approach.
We shall deviate in several respects from the symbolism used in [18] and
[19]. Mere notational differences will not be mentioned, but only clarified where
this is useful.
2 Notational Conventions
S will be the set of sentential letters1 and S± = {σ+, σ− | σ ∈ S}. From now
on we shall use σ (possibly with a subscript) as a metavariable for members of
S. A literal is a member of S ∪ {∼σ | σ ∈ S}. We shall say that a literal ∼σ
occurs in a formula A iff it is a subformula of A and that a literal σ occurs in
A iff there is an occurrence of σ in A outside the literal ∼σ. So the literals ∼p
and q occur in ∼p ∨ q, but the literal p does not occur in ∼p ∨ q.
We shall need three propositional languages, which we characterize in the
following table
language letters connectives set of formulas
L S ∼, ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃, ≡, →, ↔ W
L∗ S ∼, ∧, ∨, →, ↔ W∗
L± S ∪ S± ∼, ∧, ∨, →, ↔ W±
Occasionally we shall need W 6¬ and W 6∼ which comprise all members of W
except for those in which occurs ¬ , respectively ∼.
The duplicated connectives of L deserve a comment. The meaning of (the
standard negation) ∼ varies according to the context, whereas ¬ always denotes
classical negation, viz. the negation of CL (Classical Logic). The implication
⊃ is a detachable implication in all contexts, whereas A→ B =df ∼A ∨ B. So
→ is not detachable where ∼ is paraconsistent.2 Similarly, the equivalence ≡ is
detachable in both directions, whereas A↔ B =df (A→ B) ∧ (B → A).
As we consider different sets of formulas, let CnxL(Γ) = {A ∈ Wx | Γ `L A},
in which L is a logic and x is either nothing or ∗ or ±. For example, Cn∗CL(Γ)
denotes the set of the CL-consequences of Γ that belong to W∗.
1In [18] and [19], S is taken to be a finite set. We shall at once consider the general case
where S is infinite.
2A negation † is paraconsistent (in a context) iff (in that context) A, †A 0 B for some A
and B.
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In Section 8, we shall consider the predicative case. So there we need the
predicative extensions of the languages and sets of formulas. Before that section,
we only consider the propositional case, whence, for example, CL refers to
propositional classical logic.
3 The Signed Systems
The signed systems concern premise sets Γ ⊆ W∗,3 and require that Γ is trans-
formed into Γ±. Consider two relations on the set W±: A is a positive part of
A; if A is a positive (negative) part of B, then A is a positive (negative) part of
B ∧C, of C ∧B, of B ∨C, of C ∨B, and of C → B; if A is a positive (negative)
part of B, then A is a negative (positive) part of ∼B and of B → C. A± is
obtained by replacing in A every σ that is a positive part of A by σ+ and every
σ that is a negative part of A by ∼σ−.4
As is justly noted in [18], a more convenient approach proceeds in two steps:
A is first transformed to its negation normal form (NNF), and A± is defined
from this. The NNF of a formula A ∈ W∗ is obtained by applying all of the
following transformations to subformulas of A until no further application is
possible: replace ∼∼B by B, ∼(B∨C) by (∼B∧∼C), ∼(B∧C) by (∼B∨∼C),
B ↔ C by (B → C) ∧ (C → B), and B → C by ∼B ∨ C. Obviously, the order
of the transformations is immaterial. The resulting formula in NNF contains
only literals, ∧, ∨ and parentheses. Where B is the NNF of A, A± is obtained
by replacing in B every literal σ by σ+ and every literal ∼σ by σ−. Thus
(r ∨ ∼(p → q))± is r+ ∨ (p+ ∧ q−).5 We shall follow the more convenient
approach to A±. Where Γ ⊆ W∗, let Γ± = {A± | A ∈ Γ}. Obviously Γ± is a
consistent set of formulas (because σ+ and σ− are different sentential letters).
The signed systems are defined in terms of Ext(Γ±), the set of extensions of
Γ±. In [18] extensions are obtained by means of defaults. A simpler approach
is this:
Definition 1 ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) iff there is a Σ ⊆ S such that (i) ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪
{(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ}) is consistent and (ii) for all σ ∈ Σ,
∼(σ+ ↔ ∼σ−) ∈ ∆.6
For the two prudent consequence relations, we shall slightly deviate from
[18] in the present section, and discuss the original versions in Section 7. Where
∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), nor(∆) = {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ ∆ | σ ∈ S} (the normal
part of the extension ∆) and nor(Γ±) =
⋂{nor(∆) | ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±)} (the normal
part of Γ±). Let T = {σ+ ∨ σ− | σ ∈ S} (the T refers to Tertium non datur).
Definition 2 Where Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗, the six consequence relations are
defined as follows:
3In [18] and subsequent papers, premise sets are required to be finite. We present at once
the general case.
4Unlike what is suggested in [18], the definition of positive part and of negative part is
not completely general in that ↔ is not covered. If it were, both σ1 and σ2 would be a
positive part as well as a negative part of σ1 ↔ σ2. So the definition of A± requires that ↔
is eliminated from A.
5On the original definition from the previous paragraph in the text, (r ∨ ∼(p → q))± is
r+ ∨ ∼(p+ → ∼q−), but this is indeed CL-equivalent to r+ ∨ (p+ ∧ q−).
6There are Γ for which ∼(σ+ ↔ ∼σ−) ∈ Cn±CL(Γ±) for all σ ∈ S. In this border case
Ext(Γ±) = {Cn±CL(Γ±)} and Σ = S for the unique extension of Γ±.
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prudent unsigned consequence: Γ `p A iff A ∈ Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T )
skeptical unsigned consequence: Γ `s A iff A ∈
⋂
(Ext(Γ±))
credulous unsigned consequence: Γ `c A iff A ∈
⋃
(Ext(Γ±))
prudent signed consequence: Γ `±p A iff A± ∈ Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T )
skeptical signed consequence: Γ `±s A iff A± ∈
⋂
(Ext(Γ±))
credulous signed consequence: Γ `±c A iff A± ∈
⋃
(Ext(Γ±))
The prudent unsigned consequences are the unsigned formulas (members
of W∗) that are CL-derivable from the union of Γ± and the formulas of the
form (σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) that belong to every extension of Γ±. The
skeptical unsigned consequences are the unsigned formulas that are a member
of every extension of Γ±. The credulous unsigned consequences are the unsigned
formulas that are a member of some extension of Γ±.
An unsigned formula A is a prudent (respectively skeptical, respectively
credulous) consequence of Γ iff A± is CL-derivable from the union of Γ± and
the formulas of the form (σ+ ↔ σ)∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) that belong to every extension
of Γ± (respectively A± is a member of every extension of Γ±, respectively A±
is a member of some extension of Γ±).
While unsigned consequence sets are consistent (for all Γ), the signed ones
are inconsistent iff Γ is inconsistent.
4 Paraconsistent Preliminaries
In subsequent sections we shall need adaptive logics (see Section 5) that have
the propositional fragment of the paraconsistent logic CLuNs as their lower
limit logic.7 For reasons that become clear later on, we formulate CLuNs for
the language L. Let us start with an axiomatic system. It comprises a rule,
axioms and definitions—see [13] for another axiomatic system and for semantic
systems not discussed in the present paper.
MP From A and A ⊃ B to derive B
A⊃1 A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
A⊃2 ((B ⊃ A) ⊃ A) ⊃ A
A⊃3 (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C))
A∨1 A ⊃ (A ∨B)
A∨2 B ⊃ (A ∨B)
A∨3 (A ⊃ C) ⊃ ((B ⊃ C) ⊃ ((A ∨B) ⊃ C))
A∼ (A ⊃ ∼A) ⊃ ∼A (alternative: A ∨ ∼A)
A¬1 (A ⊃ ¬A) ⊃ ¬A
A¬2 A ⊃ (¬A ⊃ B)
A∼∼ ∼∼A ≡ A
A∼⊃ ∼(A ⊃ B) ≡ (A ∧ ∼B)
D∧ A ∧B =df ∼(∼A ∨ ∼B)
D≡ A ≡ B =df (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A)
7CLuNs is an extension of CLuN, which is like CL, except that it allows for gluts with
respect to the standard negation. The “s” inCLuNs refers to the fact that it (its propositional
version) was first presented by Schu¨tte in [22]; see also [1] and see [13] for the full predicative
logic.
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D→ A→ B =df ∼A ∨B
D↔ A↔ B =df (A→ B) ∧ (B → A)
Γ `CLuNs A and `CLuNs A are defined as usual. CLuNs comprises two
kinds of connectives: (i) the connectives of L∗, which are all defined in terms of
∼ and ∨ and (ii) classical negation ¬, the detachable implication ⊃, and the (in
both directions) detachable equivalence ≡. Incidentally, A ⊃ B can be defined
in CLuNs by ¬A ∨B.
In CLuNs, all complex inconsistencies entail truth-functions of elementary
contradictions, for example (p ∧ q) ∧ ∼(p ∧ q) `CLuNs (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q).
Replacement of Equivalents is invalid in CLuNs,8 it is even invalid if we
restrict CLuNs to the language L∗.9 However, CLuNs validates Replacement
of Equivalents outside the scope of the standard negation ∼.
We present the semantics for the propositional systems in terms of valuation
functions. A CLuNs-valuation v :W 7→ {0, 1} fulfils the following conditions:
C1 v(A ⊃ B) = 1 iff v(A) = 0 or v(B) = 1
C2 v(A ∨B) = 1 iff v(A) = 1 or v(B) = 1
C3 v(¬A) = 1 iff v(A) = 0
C4 if v(A) = 0, then v(∼A) = 1
C5 v(∼∼A) = v(A)
C6 v(∼(A ∨B)) = 1 iff v(∼A) = v(∼B) = 1
C7 v(∼(A ⊃ B)) = 1 iff v(A) = v(∼B) = 1
Clause 4 is derivable for complex A and hence may be restricted to “if
v(σ) = 0, then v(∼σ) = 1.” Γ ²CLuNs A and ²CLuNs A are defined as usual.
It is instructive to see what happens if one distinguishes the assignment and
the valuation function determined by a model. A CLuNs-assignment should
assign a truth-value to all literals. Clauses C1–3 and C5–7 may then be refor-
mulated about valuations vM determined by a model M = 〈v〉, and C4 may
then be rephrased as
C4 vM (∼σ) = 1 iff vM (σ) = 0 or v(∼σ) = 1
It is easily seen that the above axiomatic system is equivalent to that for
the propositional fragment of CLuNs from [13] and similarly for the above
semantics. So the following theorem follows from theorems proved in [13]:
Theorem 1 Γ `CLuNs A iff Γ ²CLuNs A. (Soundness and Completeness)
We now prove some properties of CLuNs that will be useful below.
Fact 1 Where ◦ ∈ {∨,∧}, if `CLuNs A ≡ B then `CLuNs (A ◦ C) ≡ (B ◦ C)
and `CLuNs (C ◦A) ≡ (C ◦B).
Fact 2 All transformations used to obtain the NNF of a formula A ∈ W∗ cor-
respond to valid CLuNs-equivalences.
Theorem 2 If B is the NNF of A ∈ W∗, then `CLuNs A ≡ B.
8For example, `CLuNs ∼(A ⊃ B) ≡ (A ∧ ∼B) but 0CLuNs ∼∼(A ⊃ B) ≡ ∼(A ∧ ∼B).
Indeed, `CLuNs ∼∼(A ⊃ B) ≡ (A ⊃ B) and `CLuNs ∼(A ∧ ∼B) ≡ (∼A ∨B), but 0CLuNs
(A ⊃ B) ≡ (∼A ∨B).
9For example, `CLuNs (A ∨ ∼A) ≡ (B ∨ ∼B), but 0CLuNs ∼(A ∨ ∼A) ≡ ∼(B ∨ ∼B).
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Proof. If one drives negations inwards from the outside, the proof is obvious in
view of Facts 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 If B is the NNF of A ∈ W∗, then a CLuNs-model verifies A iff
it verifies B.
The presence of ¬ in L enables one to express that a formula A is consistent,
viz. is not true together with its negation ∼A. The straightforward way to
express in CLuNs that A is consistently true is by the formula A ∧ ¬(A ∧
∼A), which is CLuNs-equivalent to ¬∼A.10 Similarly, the CLuNs-equivalent
formulas ∼A ∧ ¬(A ∧∼A) and ¬A express that A is consistently false. That A
is consistent is then expressed by, for example, ¬∼A ∨ ¬A.
It seems more convenient to introduce a new symbol for expressing consistent
truth and falsehood. So let !A =df ¬∼A. Remark that !∼A is ¬∼∼A, which is
CLuNs-equivalent to ¬A.
Fact 3 Where ◦ ∈ {∨,∧}, `CLuNs !(A ◦B) ≡ (!A ◦ !B).
Let f(A) be the result of replacing in the NNF of A every literal B by !B.
Theorem 3 If A ∈ W∗, then `CLuNs !A ≡ f(A).
Proof. By an obvious induction on the complexity of A in view of Facts 1, 3
and Theorem 2 .
Theorem 4 If Γ ⊆ W 6¬, then Γ is CLuNs-satisfiable.
Proof. Consider a valuation v for which v(σ) = v(∼σ) = 1 for all σ ∈ S. An
obvious induction on the complexity of A shows that v verifies all A ∈ W 6¬.
That v verifies all literals provides the basis. For the induction step: if v verifies
A and B, then v verifies ∼∼A, A ⊃ B, A ∧ B, A ∨ B, A ≡ B, ∼(A ⊃ B),
∼(A ∧B), ∼(A ∨B), and ∼(A ≡ B).
5 The Adaptive Logics
A (flat) adaptive logic11 AL is defined by a triple: (i) a monotonic lower limit
logic LLL, (ii) a set of abnormalities Ω, characterized by a (possibly restricted)
logical form, and (iii) an adaptive strategy (specifying the meaning of “inter-
preting the premises as normally as possible”).12
A Dab-formula is a disjunction of abnormalities. In any subsequent expres-
sion of the form Dab(∆), ∆ is a finite subset of Ω and Dab(∆) is a disjunction of
the members of ∆—in practice we shall identify Dab(∆) with every disjunction
of the members of ∆.
The dynamic proof theory of an adaptive logic is characterized by three
(generic) deduction rules and a marking definition. Every line of an annotated
10In CLuNs, ¬∼A expresses that ∼A is false, whereas ∼∼A merely expresses that A is
true. Also, ¬∼A `CLuNs ∼∼A but not conversely. Similarly, ¬A expresses that A is false,
which entails that ∼A is true.
11A recent survey of adaptive logics may be found in [8], an even more recent survey of
inconsistency-adaptive logics in [16].
12Extending LLL with the requirement that no abnormality is logically possible results in
a monotonic logic, which is called the upper limit logic ULL.
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dynamic proof consists of a line number, a formula, a justification, and a condi-
tion. The condition is introduced by the rules; the marking definition acts upon
it: whether a line is marked or not depends on its condition. Let Γ be the set
of premises as before. We list the deduction rules in shorthand notation. Let
A ∆
abbreviate that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆.
PREM If A ∈ Γ: . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If A1, . . . , An `LLL B: A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . , An `LLL B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
Identify (in the following lemma and elsewhere) “∨Dab(∆)” with the empty
string iff ∆ = ∅.
Lemmas and theorems that occur in this section without proofs have been
proved elsewhere. The easiest source is [12] in which all the proofs occur.
Lemma 1 A is derivable on the condition ∆ in a proof from Γ iff Γ `LLL
A ∨Dab(∆).
While the rules depend only on the lower limit logic and the set of abnormal-
ities, the marking definition depends on the strategy—the specific definitions we
shall need are mentioned below. It determines, at every stage of the proof, which
lines are “in” and which lines are “out” at that stage. A formula is derived from
Γ at a stage of the proof iff it is the formula of a line that is unmarked at that
stage. As the proof proceeds, unmarked lines may be marked and vice versa.
So, it is important that one defines a different, stable, kind of derivability:
Definition 3 A is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iff
(i) A is the formula of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) any
extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such
a way that line i is unmarked.
This means that there is a (possibly infinite) proof in which line i is unmarked
and that is stable with respect to line i (line i is unmarked in all extensions of the
proof). The previous definition is more appealing, among other things because
it has a nice game-theoretic interpretation: whenever an opponent is able to
extend the proof in such a way that line i is marked, the proponent is able to
extend it further in such a way that line i is unmarked.
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Definition 4 Γ `AL A (A is finally AL-derivable from Γ) iff A is finally
derived on a line of a proof from Γ.
The semantics of all adaptive logics is defined in the same way. The strategy
selects one or more sets of LLL-models of Γ in view of the abnormalities verified
by the models.13
Definition 5 Γ ²AL A (A is an AL-semantic consequence of Γ) iff A is verified
by all members of a selected set of LLL-models of Γ.
It is provable in terms of the general characterization of an adaptive logic
as a triple (see above) that Γ `AL A iff Γ ²AL A. The proof merely relies upon
the following: (i) the lower limit logic LLL is monotonic and compact and is
sound and complete with respect to its semantics, (ii) the set of abnormalities
is characterized by a possibly restricted14 logical form, and (iii) the properties
of the strategy. The proofs for two of the strategies we need in this paper are
outlined in [10]. There, a number of further properties of adaptive logics are
proved in terms of the general characterization. In the present paper we need
a third strategy and we shall prove enough about it to warrant soundness and
completeness and some further properties.
We shall need three adaptive strategies for characterizing the signed systems:
Reliability, Minimal Abnormality, and Normal Selections. We first introduce
some technical stuff that we shall need in the sequel. Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-
consequence of Γ iff Γ `LLL Dab(∆) and, for all ∆′ ⊂ ∆, Γ 0LLL Dab(∆′). At
every stage of a proof, zero or more Dab-formulas are derived on the condition
∅. These will be called the Dab-formulas of the stage.15 Some Dab-formulas of
stage s are minimal (in the above sense). For the semantics we need:
Definition 6 Where M is a LLL-model, Ab(M) = {A ∈ Ω | M |= A} (the
‘abnormal part’ of M).
Reliability This is the oldest strategy, introduced in [2] and [4] (which was
written earlier), and studied thoroughly at the predicative level in [5]. The un-
derlying idea is that all disjuncts of minimal Dab-consequences of Γ are consid-
ered as unreliable with respect to Γ. If one (provisionally) identifies the minimal
Dab-formulas of a stage s of a proof from Γ with the minimal Dab-consequences
of Γ, all disjuncts of the minimal Dab-formulas of stage s are considered as
unreliable at that stage.
Where Dab(∆1), . . . , Dab(∆n) are the minimal Dab-formulas of stage s of
the proof, Us(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ . . .∪∆n is the set of unreliable formulas at stage s. In
view of Definition 4, the description of the proofs is completed by:
13Adaptive logics in standard format select a single set of models, which simplifies the
definition that follows in the text. Two of the adaptive logics mentioned below are in standard
format, but we need a set of selected sets for the third one, which uses the Normal Selections
strategy (see below in the text). It can be shown that the Normal Selections strategy is easily
reduced to the Simple strategy (which delivers a logic in standard format) under a modal
translation. We shall neglect this matter here.
14We shall see an example of such a restriction when we come to the adaptive logics that
have CLuNs as their lower limit logic. Some requirements on the restriction are useful to
warrant a nice upper limit logic, but are not important for the adaptive logic itself. Anyway,
all such restrictions are fulfilled by the logics discussed in this paper.
15That Dab(∆) occurs on a condition Θ 6= ∅ in a proof from Γ does not warrant that
Γ `LLL Dab(∆). It warrants that Γ `LLL Dab(∆ ∪Θ), but we shall only call Dab(∆ ∪Θ) a
Dab-formula of stage s iff, at stage s, Dab(∆ ∪Θ) is actually derived on the condition ∅.
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Definition 7 Marking for Reliability: Line i is marked at stage s iff, where Θ
is its condition, Θ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
WhereDab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimalDab-consequences of a premise
set Γ,16 U(Γ) = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ . . . is the set of formulas that are unreliable with re-
spect to Γ. In view of Definition 5 the description of the semantics is completed
by the following definitions:
Definition 8 A LLL-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ).
Definition 9 The (sole) selected set of LLL-models of Γ is the set of the reli-
able LLL-models of Γ.
Theorem 5 Γ `ALr A iff Γ ²ALr A. (Soundness and Completeness)
The following theorem provides the bridge between the adaptive logic ALr
and the lower limit logic LLL.
Theorem 6 Γ `ALr A iff there is a finite ∆ ⊂ Ω such that Γ `LLL A∨Dab(∆)
and ∆ ∩ U(Γ) = ∅.
Minimal Abnormality This strategy was first introduced in [3] and was
studied thoroughly at the predicative level in [5]. The underlying idea is that
only minimal abnormal models are selected. Let us first complete the semantics:
Definition 10 A LLL-model M of Γ is minimal abnormal iff there is no LLL-
model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 11 The (sole) selected set of LLL-models of Γ is the set of the
minimal abnormal LLL-models of Γ.
Completing the description of the proofs is slightly more tiresome. The idea
is that the insights provided by a proof at a stage s determine which ‘derived’
formulas are indeed considered as derivable at stage s. So one (provisionally)
identifies the minimal Dab-consequences of Γ with the minimal Dab-formulas of
stage s of the proof from Γ.
The way to do this is indicated by the following consideration. Let Φ◦(Γ) be
the set of all sets that contain one disjunct out of each minimal Dab-consequence
of Γ. Let Φ(Γ) contain those members of Φ◦(Γ) that are not proper supersets
of other members of Φ◦(Γ).
Theorem 7 Φ(Γ) = {Ab(M) |M is a minimal abnormal model of Γ}.
We now apply this to a proof at a stage. Let Φ◦s(Γ) be the set of all sets that
contain one disjunct out of each minimal Dab-formula at stage s. Let Φs(Γ)
contain those members of Φ◦s(Γ) that are not proper supersets of other members
of Φ◦s(Γ).
17
16The minimal Dab-consequences of Γ may be semantically defined in view of the soundness
and completeness of LLL with respect to its semantics.
17The proofs become somewhat shorter if the definition is slightly complicated by letting
Φ?s(Γ) contain, for every ϕ ∈ Φ◦s(Γ), CnLLL(ϕ)∩Ω, and letting Φs(Γ) contain those members
of Φ?s(Γ) that are not proper supersets of other members of Φ
?
s(Γ).
January 11, 2006 signed d10 10
Definition 12 Marking for Minimal Abnormality: Line i is marked at stage s
iff, where A is derived on the condition ∆ at line i, (i) there is no ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ)
such that ϕ ∩∆ = ∅, or (ii) for some ϕ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is no line at which A is
derived on a condition Θ for which ϕ ∩Θ = ∅.
This completes the description of the proofs in view of Definition 4. Com-
pare the following two theorems to Theorems 5 and 6.
Theorem 8 Γ `ALm A iff Γ ²ALm A. (Soundness and Completeness)
Theorem 9 Γ `ALm A iff there are finite ∆1 ⊂ Ω,∆2 ⊂ Ω, . . . such that, for
every ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ), some ∆i is such that Γ `LLL A ∨Dab(∆i) and ∆i ∩ ϕ = ∅.
We shall need the following theorem and lemmas in the sequel. Theorem 10,
first proved in [10] for a specific system, is sometimes called Stopperedness or
Smoothness.
Theorem 10 If a LLL-model M of Γ is not a minimal abnormal model of Γ,
then there is a minimal abnormal model M ′ of Γ, such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
(Strong Reassurance for Minimal Abnormality)
Lemma 2 A LLL-model M of Γ verifies Dab(∆) iff ∆ ∩Ab(M) 6= ∅.
Lemma 3 Γ `LLL Dab(∆) iff Γ `ALm Dab(∆). Equivalently: Γ `LLL Dab(∆)
iff every minimal abnormal model of Γ verifies Dab(∆).
Lemma 4 U(Γ) =
⋃
Φ(Γ).
Normal Selections This strategy was first introduced in [7], where it was
used for characterizing the Weak Rescher–Manor consequence relation—see also
Section 9. We now understand the strategy better and are able to phrase its
semantics more elegantly. The description of the proofs is completed by:
Definition 13 Marking for Normal Selections: Line i is marked at stage s iff,
where ∆ is the condition of line i, Dab(∆) has been derived on the condition ∅
at stage s.
The semantics is completed by:
Definition 14 A set Ξ of LLL-models of Γ is a selected set iff, for some
ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ), Ξ = {M |M |= Γ;Ab(M) = ϕ}.
As this characterization of the semantics is new, we need to prove that final
derivability is sound and complete with respect to the semantics.
Theorem 11 Γ `ALn A iff there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω such that Γ `LLL A∨Dab(∆) and
Γ 0LLL Dab(∆).
Proof. Left–right. Suppose that Γ `ALn A, and hence, by Definition 4 that
A is finally derived on some condition, say ∆, at line i of a stage s of a proof
from Γ. By Lemma 1, it follows that Γ `LLL A ∨ Dab(∆). Suppose next that
Γ `LLL Dab(∆). It is then possible to extend the proof in such a way that it
contains a line at which Dab(∆) is derived on the condition ∅. In the extension,
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and in all extensions of the extension, line i is marked in view of Definition 13.
But this contradicts that A is finally derived on condition ∆ at line i of a stage
s.
Right–left. Suppose that there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω such that Γ `LLL A∨Dab(∆) and
Γ 0LLL Dab(∆). By Lemma 1, there is a proof from Γ in which A is derived on
the condition ∆ at a line i. By the same Lemma Dab(∆) cannot be derived on
the condition ∅ in any extension of this proof. So, by Definitions 3, 4, and 13,
Γ `ALn A.
Let Γ¬ = {¬A | A ∈ Γ}.
Theorem 12 Γ ²ALn A iff there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω such that Γ ²LLL A∨Dab(∆) and
Γ 2LLL Dab(∆).
Proof. Left–right. Suppose that Γ ²ALn A. By Definitions 5 and 14, there is a
ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ) such that all members of {M | M |= Γ;Ab(M) = ϕ} verify A. So all
LLL-models of Γ ∪ (Ω − ϕ)¬ verify A, and, by the completeness of LLL with
respect to its semantics, Γ∪(Ω−ϕ)¬ `LLL A. By the compactness of LLL there
is a finite Γ′ ⊂ Γ and a finite ϕ′ ⊂ Ω− ϕ such that Γ′ ∪ ϕ′¬ `LLL A. It follows
that Γ′ `LLL A ∨Dab(ϕ′)18 and hence that Γ `LLL A ∨Dab(ϕ′). Moreover, as
ϕ ∩ ϕ′ = ∅, Γ 0LLL Dab(ϕ′). But then Γ 2LLL Dab(ϕ′) by the completeness of
LLL with respect to the semantics.
Right–left. Suppose that there is a ∆ ⊂ Ω such that Γ ²LLL A∨Dab(∆) and
Γ 2LLL Dab(∆). By Lemmas 3 and 2, there is a ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ) such that ϕ∩∆ = ∅.
It follows that every member of {M |M |= Γ;Ab(M) = ϕ} falsifies Dab(∆) and
verifies A∨Dab(∆), and hence that every member of {M |M |= Γ;Ab(M) = ϕ}
verifies A. So Γ ²ALn A by Definitions 5 and 14.
Theorems 11 and 12 give us:
Corollary 2 Γ `ALn A iff Γ ²ALn A. (Soundness and Completeness)
We shall need three adaptive logics, which share their lower limit logic and
their set of abnormalities, viz. Ω1 = {A ∧ ∼A | A ∈ S}.19
adaptive lower limit set of
logic logic abnormalities strategy
CLuNsr CLuNs Ω1 Reliability
CLuNsm CLuNs Ω1 Minimal Abnormality
CLuNsn CLuNs Ω1 Normal Selections
To simplify the phraseology, we shall talk about a valuation as about a
model. Thus we shall say that v verifies Γ iff v(A) = 1 for all A ∈ Γ, and we
shall write Ab(v) to denote {A ∈ Ω1 | v(A) = 1}.
18We suppose here, as is the case for all logics considered, that ∨ is classical disjunction. For
a completely general formulation, it is always supposed that LLL contains all logical symbols
of CL (or that these are added).
19In some other papers, CLuNsr was called ACLuNs1 and CLuNsm was called
ACLuNs2.
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6 Characterization in Terms of Adaptive Logics
The signed systems (the six consequence relations) are defined for Γ ⊆ W∗ and
A ∈ W∗. We shall prove that, under the same restriction:
Γ `p A iff Γ `CLuNsr !A
Γ `s A iff Γ `CLuNsm !A
Γ `c A iff Γ `CLuNsn !A
Γ `±p A iff Γ `CLuNsr A
Γ `±s A iff Γ `CLuNsm A
Γ `±c A iff Γ `CLuNsn A
Let us begin by proving some properties of the signed systems.
Lemma 5 If ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), then (σ+ ↔ σ)∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ ∆ iff σ+ ↔ ∼σ− ∈
∆.
Proof. Obvious in view of Definition 1.
Lemma 6 If, for some Σ ⊆ S, ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ)∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈
S − Σ}) is consistent, then ∼(σ+ ↔ ∼σ−) ∈ ∆ iff σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆.
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. We have to prove an equivalence,
the right–left direction of which is obvious.
For the left–right direction, suppose that ∼(σ+1 ↔ ∼σ−1 ) ∈ ∆ and that
σ+1 ∧ σ−1 /∈ ∆. So there is a CL-valuation v that verifies ∆, whence v(σ+1 ↔
∼σ−1 ) = 0, and for which v(σ+1 ∧ σ−1 ) = 0. It follows that v(σ+1 ) = 0, that
v(σ−1 ) = 0, and that σ1 ∈ Σ. Let v′ be a CL-valuation that is exactly like
v except in that v′(σ+1 ) = 1. As the members of Γ
± are merely composed of
(signed) sentential letters, conjunctions, disjunctions and parentheses, and v
verifies Γ±, so does v′. As σ1 ∈ Σ and v verifies {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈
S −Σ}, so does v′. It follows that v′ verifies ∆. But v′(σ+1 ↔ ∼σ−1 ) = 1, which
contradicts ∼(σ+1 ↔ ∼σ−1 ) ∈ ∆.
Lemma 7 If ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), then σ+ ∨ σ− ∈ ∆ for all σ ∈ S.
Proof. As ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), there is a Σ ⊆ S such that (i) ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ±∪{(σ+ ↔
σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈ S −Σ}) is consistent and (ii) for all σ ∈ Σ, σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆
(by Definition 1 and Lemma 6). If σ ∈ S − Σ, then σ+ ∨ σ− ∈ ∆ (because
σ+∨∼σ+,∼σ+ ↔ σ− ∈ ∆). If σ ∈ Σ, then σ+∧σ− ∈ ∆ and hence σ+∨σ− ∈ ∆.
Lemma 8 ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) iff ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) |
σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆}).
Proof. For the left–right direction, suppose that ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±). In view of
Definition 1, there is a Σ ⊆ S such that (i) ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ±∪{(σ+ ↔ σ)∧ (σ− ↔
∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ}) is consistent and (ii) for all σ ∈ Σ, ∼(σ+ ↔ ∼σ−) ∈ ∆. By
Lemma 6, Σ = {σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
For the right–left direction, suppose that ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ
±∪{(σ+ ↔ σ)∧(σ− ↔
∼σ) | σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆}). Let Σ = {σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. If ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔
σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ}) were inconsistent, then σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆ for all
σ ∈ S, whence ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ±). But Cn±CL(Γ±) cannot be inconsistent as no
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negation occurs in Γ±. By Lemma 6, ∼(σ+ ↔ ∼σ−) ∈ ∆ for all σ ∈ Σ. But
then ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) in view of Definition 1.
In order to establish the results from the beginning of this section, we de-
fine, for every CL-valuation v for L±, an abnormal part Ab±(v), we define
certain CL-valuations for L± as regular, and we define a relation C between
CL-valuations for L± and CLuNs-valuations for L.
Definition 15 Where v is a CL-valuation for L±, Ab±(v) = {σ+∧σ− | v(σ+∧
σ−) = 1}.
Definition 16 A CL-valuation for L± is regular iff, for all σ ∈ S, (i) v(σ+ ∨
σ−) = 1 and (ii) if v(σ+ ∧ σ−) = 0, then v(σ) = v(σ+).
Definition 17 Where v is a CL-valuation for L± and vs is a CLuNs-valuation
for L, Cvvs (v corresponds to vs) iff, for all σ, v(σ+) = vs(σ) and v(σ−) =
vs(∼σ).
Lemma 9 If ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) and v is a CL-valuation for L± that verifies ∆,
then σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆ iff σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ Ab±(v).
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. As v verifies ∆, σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ Ab±(v)
if σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆ by Definition 15 and Lemma 8.
If σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆, then by Lemmas 5 and 8, σ+ ↔ ∼σ− ∈ ∆. So v(σ+ ↔
∼σ−) = 1, whence v(σ+ ∧ σ−) = 0. So σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ Ab±(v) by Definition 15.
Lemma 10 A CL-valuation v for L± verifies a ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) iff v is regular,
v verifies Γ±, and Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
Proof. For the left–right direction, suppose that v is a CL-valuation v for L±
that verifies ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±). As v(σ+ ∨σ−) = 1 (by Lemma 7) and v(σ) = v(σ+)
if v(σ+ ∧ σ−) = 0 (by Lemma 8), v is regular. By Lemma 8 v verifies Γ±. By
Lemma 9 Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
For the right–left direction, suppose that v is regular, that v verifies Γ±, and
that Ab±(v) = {σ+∧σ− | σ+∧σ− ∈ ∆} for some ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±). By Definitions
15 and 16, v((σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ)) = 1 if σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ Ab±(v), whence v
verifies {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆}. So, by Lemma 8, v verifies
∆.
Lemma 11 For every regular CL-valuation v for L± there is a CLuNs-valuation
vs for L such that Cvvs, and for every CLuNs-valuation vs for L there is a
regular CL-valuation v for L± such that Cvvs.
Proof. From Definitions 16 and 17.
If v is regular, Cvvs establishes a straightforward correspondence between
the v-value of certain formulas of L± and the vs-value of certain formulas of L.
Where A ∈ W± does not contain any unsigned sentential letters, let g(A) be the
result of systematically replacing in A first ∼ by ¬, → by ⊃, and ↔ by ≡, and
next every σ+ by σ and every σ− by ∼σ. It is easily established (by an obvious
induction on the complexity of A) that v(A) = 1 iff vs(g(A)) = 1. This does
not help us for establishing the desired result because of the weird role played
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by unsigned sentential letters in the signed systems. If v(σ+) 6= v(σ−), then
v(σ) = v(σ+); but if v(σ+) = v(σ−) = 1, then v(σ) is completely independent
of v(σ+) and v(σ−) in that it may be 0 as well as 1. Because of this, no total
translation function between L± and L corresponds to Cvvs. However, if v is
regular, then Cvvs establishes a different correspondence between v and vs:
Lemma 12 If v is a regular CL-valuation for L±, vs is a CLuNs-valuation
for L, Cvvs, and A ∈ W∗, then vs(A) = 1 iff v(A±) = 1.
Proof. The proof proceeds by an obvious induction on the complexity of A. The
basis is provided by Definitions 16 and 17. In view of Corollary 1, the induction
step reduces to two cases, which are justified by (i) vs(A∨B) = 1 iff vs(A) = 1
or vs(B) = 1 iff (by the induction hypothesis) v(A±) = 1 or v(B±) = 1 iff
v((A∨B)±) = 1, and (ii) vs(A∧B) = 1 iff vs(A) = 1 and vs(B) = 1 iff (by the
induction hypothesis) v(A±) = 1 and v(B±) = 1 iff v((A ∧B)±) = 1.
Lemma 13 If v is a regular CL-valuation for L±, vs is a CLuNs-valuation
for L, and Cvvs, then σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ Ab±(v) iff σ ∧ ∼σ ∈ Ab(vs).
Proof. Immediate in view of Lemma 12 and Definitions 6 and 15.
Lemma 14 If Γ ⊆ W∗, then, for all Σ ⊆ S, Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔
∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ}) ∈ Ext(Γ±) iff {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ ∈ Σ} ∈ Φ(Γ).
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ W∗, Σ ⊆ S, ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈
S−Σ}), and ϕ = {σ∧∼σ | σ ∈ Σ}. We have to prove ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) iff ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ).
For the left–right direction, suppose that ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) but that ϕ /∈ Φ(Γ).
By Definition 1 and Lemma 6, ∆ is consistent and σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆ iff σ ∈ Σ.
Let v be a CL-valuation that verifies ∆. By Lemma 10, v is regular, v verifies
Γ±, and Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ ∈ Σ}. So there is a CLuNs-valuation vs
such that Cvvs (by Lemma 11), for which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ ∈ Σ} (by
Lemma 13), and that verifies Γ (by Lemma 12). As {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ ∈ Σ} /∈ Φ(Γ),
there is a CLuNs-valuation v′s that verifies Γ and for which Ab(v
′
s) ⊂ Ab(vs)
(by Definition 10 and Theorem 7). But then there is a regular CL-valuation v′
such that Cv′v′s (by Lemma 11). By Lemma 12, v
′ verifies Γ±. By Lemma 13,
Ab±(v′) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ ∧ ∼σ ∈ Ab(v′s)}. So Ab±(v′) ⊂ {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ ∈ Σ}. By
Definitions 15 and 16, v′((σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ)) = 1 if σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ Ab±(v′),
whence v′ verifies {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ}. But then v′ verifies
∆, which contradicts Ab±(v′) ⊂ {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ ∈ Σ} in view of Lemma 10.
For the right–left direction, suppose that ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ). So there is a CLuNs-
valuation vs for L for which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ ∈ Σ} and that verifies Γ (by
Definition 10 and Theorem 7). It follows that there is a regular CL-valuation v
for L± such that Cvvs (by Lemma 11), for which Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ ∈ Σ}
(by Lemma 13), and that verifies Γ± (by Lemma 12). If σ ∈ S − Σ, then
σ+∧σ− /∈ Ab±(v), whence v(σ+) 6= v(σ−) (by Definitions 15 and 16). Moreover,
v(σ) = v(σ+) for all σ ∈ S − Σ by Definition 16. So, for all σ ∈ S − Σ,
v((σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ)) = 1. It follows that v verifies ∆. But then ∆ is
consistent, whence σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆ iff σ ∈ S − Σ. So ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔
σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆}), whence ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) by Lemma 8.
Lemma 15 If Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗ and ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), then A± ∈ ∆ iff
vs(A) = 1 for all CLuNs-valuations that verify Γ and for which Ab(vs) =
{σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
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Proof. Supposing that the antecedent is true, we have to prove an equivalence.
For the left–right direction, suppose that vs(A) = 0 for a CLuNs-valuation
vs that verifies Γ, for which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. By Lemma 11,
there is a regular CL-valuation v for which Cvvs. By Lemma 12, v verifies Γ±
and v(A±) = 0. By Lemma 13, Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. So, by
Lemma 10, v verifies ∆, whence A± /∈ ∆.
For the right–left direction, suppose thatA± /∈ ∆. So there is aCL-valuation
v that verifies ∆ and for which v(A±) = 0. By Lemma 10 v is regular and
Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. By Lemma 11, there is a CLuNs-
valuation vs such that Cvvs. By Lemma 12, vs verifies Γ and vs(A) = 0. By
Lemma 13, Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
Lemma 16 (σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ nor(Γ±) iff σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ U(Γ).
Proof. If ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), then, by the definition of nor(∆) and by Lemma 8,
(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ nor(∆) iff σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ ∆. So, by the definition of
nor(Γ±),
(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ nor(Γ±) (1)
iff there is no ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) for which σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆. It follows by Lemma 14
that (1) iff there is no ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ) such that σ ∧∼σ ∈ ϕ. So, by Lemma 4, (1) iff
σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ U(Γ).
Lemma 17 If no unsigned sentential letters occur in A ∈ W± and v(A) = 0
for a CL-valuation v that verifies Γ±∪nor(Γ±)∪T , then v′(A) = 0 for a regular
CL-valuation v′ that verifies Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T .
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. Let v′ be exactly as v except in that
v′(σ) = v′(σ+) = v(σ+) whenever v(σ+) 6= v(σ−). As no unsigned sentential
letter occurs in Γ±, in T , or in A, v′ verifies Γ± and T and v′(A) = 0. As
v(σ) = v(σ+) whenever (σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ nor(Γ±), v′ verifies nor(Γ±).
Let A∼∓ be the result of replacing in A± every sentential letter σ+ by the
literal ∼σ− and every sentential letter σ− by the literal ∼σ+. The proof of
Lemma 18 is obvious and left to the reader.
Lemma 18 Where A ∈ W∗, ∼(∼A)± is CL-equivalent to A∼∓.
Lemma 19 If v is a regular CL-valuation for L±, vs a CLuNs-valuation for
L, Cvvs, and A ∈ W∗, then vs(!A) = 1 iff v(∼(∼A)±) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. vs(!A) = 1 iff vs(A) = 1 and
vs(∼A) = 0. In view of the CLuNs-semantics, vs(A) = 1 and vs(∼A) = 0 iff
vs(∼A) = 0. By Lemma 12, vs(∼A) = 0 iff v((∼A)±) = 0. So vs(!A) = 1 iff
v(∼(∼A)±) = 1.
Remark that ∼(∼σ)± is ∼σ− and that ∼(∼∼σ)± is ∼σ+.
Lemma 20 If Γ ⊆ W∗, †σ1 ∨ . . . ∨ †σn ∈ W∗ (in which each † is either ∼
or nothing), Σ ⊆ S, and ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈
S − Σ}) or ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ} ∪ T ), then
†σ1 ∨ . . . ∨ †σn ∈ ∆ iff ∼(∼ † σ1)± ∨ . . . ∨ ∼(∼ † σn)± ∈ ∆.
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Proof. Supposing that the antecedent is true, we have to prove an equivalence.
For the left–right direction, suppose that
†σ1 ∨ . . . ∨ †σn (2)
is a member of ∆. Case 1 : (2) is a minimal disjunction in ∆ (viz. if any
disjunct of (2) is deleted, the result is not a member of ∆). It follows that there
is a CL-valuation that verifies ∆ and that assigns the value 0 to all but one
disjuncts of (2). So, if there is a σi ∈ {σ1, . . . , σn}∩Σ, then, as σi does not occur
unsigned in Γ± or in T , some CL-valuation verifies ∆ and assigns the value 0
to all disjuncts of (2),20 which is impossible. It follows that σ1, . . . , σn ∈ S −Σ
whence ∼(∼ † σ1)± ∨ . . . ∨ ∼(∼ † σn)± ∈ ∆. Case 2 : (2) is not a minimal
disjunction in ∆. Then Case 1 obtains for a selection of disjuncts of (2), and,
by Addition, ∼(∼ † σ1)± ∨ . . . ∨ ∼(∼ † σn)± ∈ ∆.
The proof of the right–left direction is wholly analogous to the proof of the
left–right direction.
Lemma 21 If Γ ⊆ W∗, A ∈ W∗ and, for some Σ ⊆ S, ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ±∪{(σ+ ↔
σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) | σ ∈ S − Σ}) or ∆ = Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ {(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) |
σ ∈ S − Σ} ∪ T ), then A ∈ ∆ iff ∼(∼A)± ∈ ∆.
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. Let B be the conjunctive normal
form of A, whence A is CL-equivalent to B and ∼(∼A)± is CL-equivalent to
∼(∼B)±. Let †σ1∨. . .∨†σn be as in Lemma 20. A ∈ ∆ iff †σ1∨. . .∨†σn ∈ ∆ for
every conjunct †σ1∨ . . .∨†σn of B. By Lemma 20, the consequent holds true iff
∼(∼†σ1)±∨. . .∨∼(∼†σn)± ∈ ∆ for every conjunct ∼(∼†σ1)±∨. . .∨∼(∼†σn)±
of B∼∓, and this consequent holds true iff B∼∓ ∈ ∆. By Lemma 18, B∼∓ is
CL-equivalent to ∼(∼B)∓, and this is equivalent to ∼(∼A)±. So A ∈ ∆ iff
∼(∼A)± ∈ ∆.
Lemma 22 If Γ ⊆ W∗, A ∈ W∗, and ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±), then A ∈ ∆ iff vs(!A) = 1
for all CLuNs-valuations that verify Γ and for which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ |
σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ W∗, A ∈ W∗, and ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±).
For the left–right direction, suppose that vs(!A) = 0 for a CLuNs-valuation
vs that verifies Γ and for which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. By Lemma
11, there is a regular CL-valuation such that Cvvs. By Lemma 12, v verifies
Γ±, by Lemma 19, v(∼(∼A)±) = 0, and by Lemma 13, Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− |
σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. So, by Lemma 10, v verifies ∆, whence ∼(∼A)± /∈ ∆. But then
A /∈ ∆ by Lemma 21.
For the right–left direction, suppose that A /∈ ∆, whence ∼(∼A)± /∈ ∆
by Lemma 21. So there is a CL-valuation v that verifies ∆ and for which
v(∼(∼A)±) = 0. By Lemma 10 v is regular and Ab±(v) = {σ+ ∧ σ− | σ+ ∧
σ− ∈ ∆}. By Lemma 11, there is a CLuNs-valuation vs such that Cvvs.
By Lemma 12, vs verifies Γ, by Lemma 19, vs(!A) = 0, and by Lemma 13,
Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}.
20We have seen that there is a CL-valuation v for which v(σi) = 1 whereas v(σj) = 0 for
all σj ∈ {σ1, . . . , σn} − {σi}. So, where v′ is exactly like v except that v′(σi) = 0, v′ verifies
all members of ∆ and falsifies all disjuncts of (2).
January 11, 2006 signed d10 17
Theorem 13 Where Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗, Γ `±s A iff Γ `CLuNsm A and
Γ `s A iff Γ `CLuNsm !A.
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗.
For the left–right direction, suppose that Γ 0CLuNsm A (respectively Γ 0CLuNsm
!A). So, by Definitions 5, 10, and 11 and Theorems 7 and 8, vs(A) = 0 (re-
spectively vs(!A) = 0) for some CLuNs-valuation that verifies Γ and for which
Ab(vs) ∈ Φ(Γ). By Definition 1 and Lemmas 6 and 14, there is a ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±)
for which σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆ iff σ ∧ ∼σ ∈ Ab(vs). By Lemma 15 (respectively
Lemma 22), A± /∈ ∆ (respectively A /∈ ∆). So, by Definitions 1 and 2, Γ 0±s A
(respectively Γ 0s A).
For the right–left direction, suppose that Γ 0±s A (respectively Γ 0s A). By
Definition 2, there is a ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) for which A± /∈ ∆ (respectively A /∈ ∆).
By Lemma 15 (respectively Lemma 22), vs(A) = 0 (respectively vs(!A) = 0)
for some CLuNs-valuation vs that verifies Γ and for which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧∼σ |
σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. By Definition 1 and Lemmas 6 and 14, Ab(vs) ∈ Φ(Γ), whence
vs is a minimal abnormal valuation that verifies Γ. So, by Definitions 5, 10, and
11 and Theorems 7 and 8, Γ 0CLuNsm A (respectively Γ 0CLuNsm !A).
Theorem 14 Where Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗, Γ `±c A iff Γ `CLuNsn A and
Γ `c A iff Γ `CLuNsn !A.
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗.
For the left–right direction, suppose (i) that Γ `±c A (respectively Γ `c A)
and (ii) that Γ 0CLuNsn A (respectively Γ 0CLuNsn !A). By Definition 2 (i)
entails that A± ∈ ∆ (respectively A ∈ ∆) for some ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±). By Definition
1 and Lemmas 6 and 14, {σ∧∼σ | σ+∧σ− ∈ ∆} ∈ Φ(Γ). In view of Definitions
5 and 14, Theorem 7, and Corollary 2, (ii) and {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆} ∈
Φ(Γ) jointly entail that, vs(A) = 0 (respectively vs(!A) = 0) for some CLuNs-
valuation that verifies Γ± and for which Ab(vs) = {σ∧∼σ | σ+∧σ− ∈ ∆}. But
then, by Lemma 15 (respectively Lemma 22), A± /∈ ∆ (respectively A /∈ ∆),
which is impossible.
For the right–left direction, suppose that Γ 0±c A (respectively Γ 0c A).
So, By Definition 2, A± /∈ ∆ (respectively A /∈ ∆) holds for all ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±).
By Lemma 15 (respectively 22), it holds for all ∆ ∈ Ext(Γ±) that vs(A) = 0
(respectively vs(!A) = 0) for some CLuNs-valuation vs that verifies Γ and for
which Ab(vs) = {σ ∧ ∼σ | σ+ ∧ σ− ∈ ∆}. By Definition 1 and Lemmas 6
and 14, it holds for all ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ) that vs(A) = 0 (respectively vs(!A) = 0)
for some CLuNs-valuation vs that verifies Γ and for which Ab(vs) = ϕ. But
then Γ 0CLuNsn A (respectively Γ 0CLuNsn !A) by Definitions 5 and 14 and
Corollary 2.
Theorem 15 Where Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗, Γ `±p A iff Γ `CLuNsr A and
Γ `p A iff Γ `CLuNsr !A.
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗.
For the left–right direction, suppose that Γ 0CLuNsr A (respectively Γ 0CLuNsr
!A). By Theorem 5 and Definitions 5, 8 and 9, vs(A) = 0 (respectively vs(!A) =
0) for some CLuNs-valuation vs that verifies Γ and for which Ab(vs) ⊆ U(Γ).
In view of Lemma 11, there is a regular CL-valuation v such that Cvvs. As
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v is regular, v verifies T . By Lemma 12, v verifies Γ±. By Lemma 12 (re-
spectively Lemma 19), v(A±) = 0 (respectively v(∼(∼A)±) = 0). By Lemma
13, if σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ U(Γ), then σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ Ab±(v) and hence v(σ+) 6= v(σ−). As
v is regular, v((σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ)) = 1 whenever σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ U(Γ) (by
Definition 15). So, by Lemma 16, v((σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ)) = 1 whenever
(σ+ ↔ σ) ∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ nor(Γ±). By the Soundness of CL with respect to
its semantics, Γ 0±p A (respectively Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T 0CL ∼(∼A)± and , by
Lemma 21, Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T 0CL A). But then Γ 0±p A (respectively Γ 0p A)
in view of Definition 2.
For the right–left direction, suppose that Γ 0±p A (respectively Γ 0p A). By
Definition 2, Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T 0CL A± (respectively Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T 0CL A
whence, by Lemma 21, Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±) ∪ T 0CL ∼(∼A)±). So there is a CL-
valuation v that verifies Γ±∪nor(Γ±)∪T and for which v(A±) = 0 (respectively
v(∼(∼A)±) = 0, whence v(A∼∓) = 0 by Lemma 18). By Lemma 17, there is a
regular CL-valuation v that verifies Γ± ∪nor(Γ±)∪T and for which v(A±) = 0
(respectively v(A∼∓) = 0, whence v(∼(∼A)±) = 0 in view of Lemma 18). In
view of theCL-semantics, σ+∧σ− /∈ Ab±(v) if (σ+ ↔ σ)∧(σ− ↔ ∼σ) ∈ nor(Γ).
So, by Lemma 16, σ+ ∧ σ− /∈ Ab±(v) if σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ U(Γ). As v is regular, there
is a CLuNs-valuation vs such that Cvvs. By Lemma 12, vs verifies Γ. By
Lemma 12 (respectively Lemma 19), vs(A) = 0 (respectively vs(!A) = 0). By
Lemma 13, σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ Ab(vs) if σ ∧ ∼σ /∈ U(Γ), whence Ab(vs) ⊆ U(Γ). But
then, by Definitions 5, 8, and 9 and Theorem 5, Γ 0CLuNsr A (respectively
Γ 0CLuNsr !A).
7 The Original Sceptical Consequence Relations
In Section 3 we have deviated, for the prudent signed and unsigned consequence
relations, from the original definitions, which go as follows (we use a different
font for the subscripted p):
Definition 18 Where Γ ⊆ W∗ and A ∈ W∗,
prudent unsigned consequence: Γ `p A iff A ∈ Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±))
prudent signed consequence: Γ `±p A iff A± ∈ Cn±CL(Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±))
We deviated for different reasons. The first, pragmatic, reason is that the
deviation allows for a more systematic characterization of the consequence re-
lations in Section 6. A second, philosophical, reason is that, where the problem
is to handle inconsistencies, it is odd that the prudent consequence relations do
not (seem to) require negation-completeness (either A or ∼A is true), the more
so as the credulous and skeptical consequence relations are negation-complete.
A third reason is related to the prudent signed consequence relation only and
requires some more explanation.
Astonishing as it may seem, the change in the definition of the prudent
unsigned consequence relation does not affect its consequence set:
Theorem 16 Under the linguistic restrictions imposed by the definitions on Γ
and A, Γ `p A iff Γ `p A.
Proof. The left–right direction is obvious in view of the definitions. For the
right–left direction, suppose that some CL-valuation v verifies Γ± ∪ nor(Γ±)
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but that v(A) = 0 (whence Γ 0p A) and that, for one or more σ, v(σ+) =
v(σ−) = 0 (whence v does not verify T ). Let v′ be exactly as v except in that
v(σ+) = v′(σ−) = 1 whenever v(σ+) = v(σ−) = 0. As v verifies Γ±, so does
v′ (for the reasons explained in the proof of Lemma 6). As v verifies nor(Γ±),
so does v′ (because v verifies nor(Γ±) and σ cannot occur in any member of
nor(Γ±) if v(σ+) = v(σ−) = 0). As v(A) = 0, v′(A) = 0 (because σ does not
occur in A ∈ W±). But v′ verifies T . So Γ 0p A.
However Γ `±p A does not entail Γ `±p A. Of course the original prudent
signed consequence relation can be reconstructed in terms of an adaptive logic,
viz. in terms of an adaptive logic that has CLoNs as its lower limit logic.21
CLoNs is obtained by removing axiom A∼ from the axiom system for CLuNs;
its semantics by removing clause C4 from the CLuNs-semantics.
The adaptive logic CLoNsr1 is defined by the lower limit logic CLoNs,
the set of abnormalities Ω1 and the Reliability strategy. Where Γ ⊆ W∗ and
A ∈ W∗:
Γ `±p A iff Γ `CLoNsr1 A
The proof that the characterization is correct is wholly analogous to the
proofs (for the signed relations) from the previous section, except that “regular
CL-valuation” should be replaced by “quasi-regular CL-valuation,” where a
CL-valuation for L± is quasi-regular iff, for all σ ∈ S, v(σ) = v(σ+) whenever
v(σ+ ∧ σ−) = 0.
That the original prudent signed consequence relation is characterized by a
different adaptive logic than the five other original consequence relations, reveals
that it handles premise sets differently. An immediate consequence, for example,
is that, for the original prudent signed consequence relation, premise sets are
invariant under CLoNs-transformations only (if CnCLoNs(Γ1) = CnCLoNs(Γ2)
then Γ1 `±p A iff Γ2 `±p A), whereas all other original consequence relations are
invariant under CLuNs-transformations.
This is easily illustrated by the following example. Let Γ1 = {p ∨ q, p ∨
∼q,∼p ∨ q,∼p ∨ ∼q} and Γ2 = Γ1 ∪ {p ∨ ∼p}. Γ1 and Γ2 have exactly the
same sets of consequences for all discussed consequence relations except for the
original prudent signed consequence relation. Indeed, Γ1 0±p p ∨ ∼p (because
Γ±1 ∪nor(Γ±1 ) 0CL p+∨p−), whereas Γ2 `±p p∨∼p (because p+∨p− ∈ Γ2). This
also shows that the modified prudent signed consequence relation from Section
3 is more coherent with the five other consequence relations than the original
one. Indeed, Γ1 `±p p ∨ ∼p (because p+ ∨ p− ∈ T ).22
The authors of [18] did not remark this anomaly. Worse, their Theorem 4.1
states that, if Γ `p A, then Γ `±p A. To see that this is a mistake: Γ1 `p p∨∼p
but Γ1 0±p p ∨ ∼p. When one looks at the ‘proof’ of the theorem (p. 209 sub
(1)), one readily sees what went wrong. The authors claim (modified to our use
of symbols) in relation to an unsigned consequence A that “for every (unsigned)
occurrence of σ or ∼σ in A, there is an equivalence σ ↔ σ+ or ∼σ ↔ σ− in the
21CLoNs allows for both gluts and gaps with respect to negation, and the “s” refers to the
fact that it (its propositional version) was first presented by Schu¨tte in [22].
22Remark, however, that Γ1 `±p (p ∨ ∼p) ∨ (q ∨ ∼q). In general, it can be proved that, for
every Γ ⊆ W∗ and for every σ1 ∈ S, either Γ `±p σ1 ∨∼σ1 or there is a set {σ2, . . . , σn} such
that Γ `±p (σ1 ∨ ∼σ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (σn ∨ ∼σn) whereas Γ 0±p σi ∨ ∼σi whenever i ∈ {1, . . . , n}—
another bizarre property of the original prudent signed consequence relation.
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underlying theory” (the underlying theories are mentioned in the consequent of
the equivalences in Definitions 2 and 18). But this is simply false. First of all
{p, q,∼q} `i p∨q (where i ∈ {s, p, c}) holds true notwithstanding the absence of
q ↔ q+, because {p, q,∼q} `i p. Next, all CL-theorems (in W∗) are members
of all unsigned consequence relations, because the latter are closed under CL.
Put differently, even in the absence of (σ ↔ σ+)∧(∼σ ↔ σ−) all CL-valuations
have to assign a truth-value to σ, whence they all verify all CL-theorems inW∗.
Of course we could easily characterize variants for all six consequence rela-
tions in terms of CLoNsr1 , CLoNsm1 , and CLoNsn1 respectively, but this
would be somewhat funny, as it is not clear how the variants are defined in
terms of extensions of Γ± and as the authors of [18] did not realize the singular
properties of the prudent signed consequence relation. Moreover, we do not like
the whole approach. If there are reasons to allow for both gluts and gaps with
respect to negation, and next to interpret the premises as normally as possible,
one should not only rule out negation gluts whenever possible, but also nega-
tion gaps. So, in that case, we would advertise the adaptive logics CLoNsr ,
CLoNsm , and CLoNsn , defined from the lower limit logic CLoNs, the set of
abnormalities Ω2 = {A∧∼A | A ∈ S}∪{¬A∧¬∼A | A ∈ S}, and the strategies
Reliability, Minimal Abnormality, and Normal Selections respectively.
The previous paragraph involves an implicit criticism of the signed systems
approach. First, the transformation to Γ± allows for both gluts and gaps—both
v(σ+) = v(σ−) = 1 and v(σ+) = v(σ−) = 0 are possible—which is odd if one
merely wants to handle inconsistencies. Next, for five of the six consequence
relations negation gaps (v(σ+) = v(σ−) = 0) are ruled out indirectly, viz. as a
side effect (and not a transparent one) of minimizing negation gluts. No wonder
something went wrong somewhere.
8 Linguistic Extensions of the Logics
Until now it was always presupposed that all premises belong toW∗. The reason
for this is that, in [18] and [19], implication is handled as a disjunction: A→ B
is handled exactly as ∼A ∨B.
Once the signed systems have been characterized in terms of adaptive logics,
there is no reason for not allowing the detachable implication ⊃ to occur in the
premises. The main effect of this move is as expected, viz. that the implication
is detachable independently of the occurrence of inconsistencies. This has not
only effects for the signed consequence relations, but also, as we shall illustrate,
for the unsigned ones.
Remember thatW 6¬ comprises all members ofW in which ¬ does not occur.
It is easily provable that every finite Γ ⊂ W 6¬ has CLuNs-models and hence
has a non-trivial CLuNs-consequence set. So there is no technical justification
for not allowing ⊃ in premises. That such premises can only be handled in
the signed systems at the expense of further complications (which we shall not
describe here) only illustrates the restrictions imposed by signed systems.
Example 1. Γ1 = {p,∼p, p→ q}, Γ2 = {p,∼p, p ⊃ q}. For the three adaptive
logics considered (let CLuNsx refer to all three of them), Γ1 `CLuNsx !A only
holds if A is a CL-theorem. This is not the case for Γ2, as, for example,
Γ2 `CLuNsx !q. As p → q is an obvious consequence of ∼p, CnxCLuNs(Γ1) =
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CnxCLuNs({p,∼p}). In view of the fact that Modus Ponens is CLuNs-valid for
⊃, CnxCLuNs(Γ2) = CnxCLuNs({p,∼p, q}).
Unlike Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens is not CLuNs-valid. From (i) A is
false or B is true and (ii) ∼B is false does not follow that ∼A is true. So ⊃ is
asymmetric, as its semantic interpretation clearly reveals. The effect of this is
illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Γ1 = {p,∼q, p→ q,∼p∨r, q∨s}, Γ2 = {p,∼q, p ⊃ q,∼p∨r, q∨s}.
Γ1 has two extensions, one in which p is consistent and q inconsistent, and one
in which p is inconsistent and q consistent. Γ2 to the contrary has only one
extension, in which q is inconsistent. As a result, Γ1 `CLuNsm !(p ∨ ∼q) ∧
!(r ∨ s), whereas Γ2 `CLuNsm !p ∧ !r.
Remark that Γ2 0CLuNsm !(p ⊃ q) because Γ2 `CLuNs p ∧ ∼q.
Most realistic applications of the signed systems will require that they are
extended to the predicative level. To do so, however, is far from obvious. One
might attach the signs to primitive formulas, rather than to letters, but then
one should allow for quantification over signed formulas, which turns the signs
into operators rather than into notational symbols that introduce new sentential
letters—for example one should ensure that ∀x(Px− ∨Qx+) `CL Pa− ∨Qa+;
and special provisions are required to ensure a = b+, a = c− `CL b = c−
whereas a = b−, a = c− 0CL b = c−. Further trouble arises from the predicative
equivalent of (σ+ ↔ σ)∧ (σ− ↔ ∼σ), in which σ should apparently be replaced
by closed primitive formulas only.
No such trouble arises for the adaptive logics. The language and sets of for-
mulas are extended as expected. The predicative versions ofCLuNsr ,CLuNsm ,
and CLuNsn are simply obtained by having the full (predicative) logic CLuNs
(see [13] for its syntax and semantics) as the lower limit logic, retaining the strat-
egy, and redefining Ω1 = {∃(A∧∼A) | A ∈ Fp}, in which Fp is the set of (closed
or open) primitive formulas and ∃A is the existential closure of A (A preceded
by an existential quantifier over every free variable that occurs in it).
9 In Conclusion
We have modified the prudent signed consequence relation and offered good
reasons for doing so. Remark that this modification is a result of our character-
ization in terms of adaptive logics. This holds even for the philosophical reasons
because the oddities of the prudent signed consequence relation were discovered
by attempting to find their adaptive characterization.
We have spelled out a number of advantages of the adaptive characterization
in Section 1 and trust that these advantages became clear during the preceding
sections. As for the transparency that was improved by the adaptive characteri-
zation, remark that, for all adaptive logics, the consequence sets are closed under
the lower limit logic, and the premise sets are invariant under transformations
by the lower limit logic. By the latter we mean that, if CnLLL(Γ1) = CnLLL(Γ2)
then CnAL(Γ1) = CnAL(Γ2). As for further properties that are available (for all
adaptive logics in standard format), we mention only a few general ones (they
hold for all three strategies where not indicated otherwise):
Strong Reassurance for Minimal Abnormality (Theorem 10) and Reliability.
Fixed Point: CnAL(Γ) = CnAL(CnAL(Γ)).
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Immunity: for all ∆ ⊆ Ω, Dab(∆) ∈ CnAL(Γ) iff Dab(∆) ∈ CnLLL(Γ).
Cautious Cut: if ∆ ⊆ CnAL(Γ) and A ∈ CnAL(Γ ∪∆), then A ∈ CnAL(Γ).
Cautious Monotonicity:
if ∆ ⊆ CnAL(Γ), and A ∈ CnAL(Γ), then A ∈ CnAL(Γ ∪∆).
Relation between the adaptive logics:
general: CnLLL(Γ) ⊆ CnALr (Γ) ⊆ CnALm (Γ) ⊆ CnALn (Γ) ⊆ CnULL(Γ)
Γ normal: CnLLL(Γ) ⊂ CnALr (Γ) = CnALm (Γ) = CnALn (Γ) = CnULL(Γ)
Γ abnormal: CnLLL(Γ) ⊆ CnALr (Γ) ⊆ CnALm (Γ) ⊆ CnALn (Γ) ⊂ CnULL(Γ)
plus a specification of the conditions under which ⊆ can be specified to ⊂ in the
above.
We also claimed that the adaptive characterization gives the logics a place in
a unified framework, which facilitates the comparison with other inconsistency-
handling logics. To illustrate this, compare the lower half of the list at the
beginning of Section 6 with the following one for the (flat) Rescher–Manor
consequence relations (see [20], [21], [17]). LetW 6∼ comprise the members ofW
in which ∼ does not occur and let Γ∼¬ = {∼¬A | A ∈ Γ}. It was proven in [7]
that, where Γ ⊆ W 6∼ and A ∈ W 6∼:
Γ `Free A iff Γ∼¬ `CLuNr A.
Γ `Strong A iff Γ∼¬ `CLuNm A.
Γ `Weak A iff Γ∼¬ `CLuNn A
In these definitions, the adaptive logics CLuNx are defined by the following
triples: lower limit logic: the (predicative) paraconsistent logic CLuN from [5]
(see [1] for the propositional version); set of abnormalities Ω = {∃(A ∧ ∼A) |
A ∈ F}, in which F is the set of all (open and closed) formulas; strategy: Reli-
ability, Minimal Abnormality, and Normal Selections respectively. Incidentally,
the adaptive approach at once offers an interesting set of alternative logics by
further varying on lower limit logic, possibly combining it with the ∼¬ transfor-
mation of the premises, with the !-requirement on the consequences, with modal
transformations as in [9], etc.—the strategies do not seem to offer much further
variations.
Let us finally offer some comments on the logics studied in this paper. For
mathematical applications, inconsistency-adaptive logics that have CLuNs as
their lower limit logic may be useful. For inconsistencies that occur in empirical
theories, it was argued, for example in [6], that inconsistency-adaptive logics
that have CLuN as their lower limit logic are usually superior. So we sug-
gest that the adequacy of specific inconsistency-handling mechanisms should be
given due attention. We also have some doubt about the usefulness of selecting
the ‘consistent part’ (the consequences !A for which consistency is adaptively
provable) of an inconsistent theory. If the intention is to replace an inconsistent
theory by a consistent improvement of it, the consistent part of the theory is
clearly too poor. One has to locate the problems, viz. the inconsistencies, and
next set out to eliminate them in a justified way, which will require non-logical
work triggered by the specific inconsistencies. Maybe consistent parts are useful
for some application contexts, but then the adequacy of a specific method for
obtaining them should be carefully studied.
We would like to submit, as a general conclusion, that the adaptive ap-
proach is promising for unifying and systematically elaborating the study of
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inconsistency-handling mechanisms.23
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